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As in Poland and Hungary, in Czechoslovakia the round table talks between the
ruling Communist Party and the broad coalition of dissident and opposition forces
(the Civic Forum) took place in 1989, thus facilitating a peaceful and coordinated
regime change. In a rapid sequence of events, the Civic Forum was established
on 19 November 1989 in one of Prague’s theatres in response to a brutal police
crackdown on a student demonstration which took place on 17 November as a
commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Nazi closure of Czech universities.
The top leadership of the Communist Party, including the General Secretary Miloš
Jakeš, resigned on 24 November. On 27 November, a nation-wide general strike
occurred, demanding the end of the one-party rule and the free election.
Round table negotiations between the Civic Forum and the leaders of the
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia which followed the unexpected nation-
wide mobilization of students, workers, and citizens paved the way for a swift
democratic transition. Within days, the parliament eliminated the articles about
the leading role of the communist party and the dominance of Marxist-Leninist
ideology. The government was reconstructed to include other political parties and
independents. On 29 December, Václav Havel was elected president. In January
1990, new members were coopted into the Federal Assembly and national legislative
bodies. The agreement on a new electoral system was reached and in June 1990,
Czechoslovakia held its first free and democratic elections since 1920.
Polish and Hungarian round tables set the baseline for negotiations in
Czechoslovakia. Unlike in Poland and Hungary where roundtables were initiated as
elite negotiations, the Czechoslovakian one was set up after mass demonstrations
spread. The call for a round table was made by the Communist Party. The initially
preferred strategy of the Civic Forum was the strategy they called a “dialogue
with the powers that be” and that of external control on the self-transformation
and liberalization of the Communist Party. Strongly influenced by Václav Havel’s
preference for “non-political politics” (against parliamentarism and party system,
preference for charismatic leadership, self-organization, horizontal non-hierarchic
structure), Civic Forum was unwilling and unprepared to overtake power. When
it was compelled to assume a more active role in the transition, as a result of the
retreat of the Communist Party, it displayed unnecessary restraint and failed to
channel the dynamic of the wide popular support into demands for more sweeping
changes (e.g. propose a candidate for prime minister, seize control of the Ministry of
Inferior and the secret police archives).
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Concerns for the continuity of the state and the constitution were the dominant
mantra of the Czechoslovak transition. While communists sought to stay in the new
political game, the Civic Forum feared the disintegration of the state, the collapse
of the administration, and empty legislative chambers unable to enact the key
transitional steps. The lack of personnel to take over and the self-perception of the
Civic Forum’s role as a transition facilitator, integrating a plurality of interests, and
not as a political party, are key to understanding the strong commitment to legal
and institutional continuity. This commitment blocked any efforts to change the
communist constitution and its Constitutional Act on the Czechoslovak Federation
from 1968 which introduced the system of bicameral legislature and required that
constitutional amendments are approved with three-fifths supermajority both in
the Chamber of the People and in each national half in the upper Chamber of the
Nations. The refusal to produce an interim constitution or change the existing one
to accommodate to the new political reality of democracy and political pluralism
in the two-nation state caused a deadlock which contributed to the breakup of
Czechoslovakia.
Round Tables and the Commitment to the Rule of
Law
National specifics and ambiguities notwithstanding, round tables have been
established as one of the most important innovations of modern politics of
constitution making and regime change. Eastern European coordinated transitions
from communist dictatorship were crucial for making them a preferred device for
the revolutionaries trying to avoid chaos, violence, and instability inherent in the
radical politics of the pouvoir constituant – the constituent power of the people.
As Ulrich Preuß remarked, round tables worked as “midwives” so to speak for the
generation of legitimate actors and the creation of new rules of the new game and for
negotiating the conditions for the creation of a new constitution. Based on the 1989
experience, round tables became an indispensable instrument in what Andrew Arato
called a new paradigm of post-sovereign constitution making – a two-stage process
of making an interim and the final constitution where the rules of the first constitution
constrain the second.
What are round tables’ distinct features? As János Kis pointed out, the moral
advantages of a negotiated transition are enormous and they amount to much
more than preserving peace, avoiding breakdown, and coordinating changes
within available institutions. The innovation of round tables consists in that they
(re)institutionalize and embed the political values of constitutionalism and democracy
in the process of the regime change itself. Based on the modern practice of round
tables, from 1989 predecessors to round tables in Chile, Colombia, or South Africa,
their two fundamental principles can be identified: representation (plurality, inclusion,
and participation of decisive political forces, and symmetrical consensus building)
and legality (regularity, procedural legitimacy, publicity, transparency, accountability,
and appeals to broad notion of justice and human rights).
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Legality is the most striking and unique innovation of round tables during 1989
transitions in Eastern Europe and their most relevant feature. Strict adherence to
constitutionalism and the rule of law is to be explained by an enormous authority of
the rule of law, constitutionalism, and human rights and their being seen as ways
to achieve the projects of multiparty constitutional democracy and free market
economy. As Kis put it, the politics of legal continuity was based on the “as if”
assumption that the legitimate rule of law is already in place. This made it possible
to act as if the other side had been a legitimate partner in a common search for a
principled consensus as if the old parliament had the authority to enact new rules,
as if the round table represented the people’s will and could make decisions with
binding force. Acting in the “as if” mode made it possible to complete the transition
toward the legitimate rule of law under the old rule of law.
Given the ultimate value the Eastern European round tables placed on
constitutionalism and the rule of law, a question arises: What explains the current
decline of constitutionalism in this region? Could a round table serve as a tool for the
reconstruction of democratic constitutionalism?
Round Tables and Constitutional Politics Today
Round tables have become a crucial device in extraordinary political moments of a
breakdown in which it is necessary to establish a representative plurality of actors
and interests who have some degree of legitimacy to produce the rules of the game
for the transitional period and for the production of a new constitution. Their key
role is to redistribute power and agency anew, to reestablish the representation
of political forces and interests out of no longer legitimate, asymmetrical, or
non-existent power distribution, and to include actors in the game who were
unjustly excluded or underrepresented. The goal of round tables is then to provide
constitutive rules for the process of making norms with a constitutional nature. The
use of round tables to frame and to proceduralize the process which leads to a new
constitution makes them uniquely applicable in the context of regime change and
constitution making following a fundamental political transformation.
Several issues can be identified in the post-transition history of the Czech Republic.
Constitutional issues concern the asymmetry between the legislative and weak
constitutional authority of the executive, a strong directly elected presidency, and the
proportional electoral system which does not facilitate the formation of parliamentary
majorities. Unstable cabinets, shaky coalitions, and frequent use of technocratic
cabinets can also be related to the institutional weakness of political parties (small
membership base, poor organization, corruption), the ideological polarization and the
blocked left (communists continuously present but with no coalition potential), and a
relatively weak civil society.
Since 2013, there has been some degree of democratic backsliding in the Czech
Republic, i.e. a gradual process of regression of democracy resulting from executive
aggrandizement, weakening of constitutional checks and balances (courts, judiciary,
the media), and asserting control over state-owned companies. The source of
backsliding is twofold. On one hand, there is the current Czech president Miloš
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Zeman and his geopolitical orientation toward China and Russia and his repeated
ignorance of the constitutional rules of the political process. On the other hand
– and more significantly – there is a significant level of concentration and the
fusion of the private economic and media power with the political power and the
authoritarian managerial political style of its current Prime Minister Andrej Babiš
and his technocratic-populist movement ANO. Both Zeman’s and Babiš’s repeated
subversions of constitutionalism have been undermining the pluralistic democratic
governance. Still, according to accepted assessment standards of democratic
governance, the Czech Republic is a consolidated democracy and the Zeman-Babiš
tandem has not eroded Czech democracy to such an extent that we can speak about
an illiberal regime.
Given the features and the role of round tables and the specific context of
constitutional politics in which they serve as an important strategic instrument, I
do not see any meaningful role for roundtables to address democratic backsliding,
at least not in the Czech Republic. The applicability of roundtables beyond the
context of regime change and constitution making depends on how broad the
notion of constitutionalism and constitution-making we are willing to accept. If
we agree that round tables are institutionalized fora which enable to involve all
legitimate actors in a negotiation about rules with a constitutional nature, not just
constitutions in the narrow sense of the term, then we can, for example, envision
their role in international law making or in processes of making rules of transnational
governance. In fact, round tables have been used and successfully replicated in the
making of a range of norms of international environmental law (e.g. UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea or the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer) or transnational private governance (e.g. the pioneering Roundtable on
Sustainable Palm Oil). Given the urgency and global or transnational nature of
some risks (e.g. climate change) and hence the necessity to create representative
bodies which cut across existing borders and transcend available systems of
political representation, it is plausible to ask what role can round tables play in the
reinvention of the global rules of the game.
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